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The Causal Situationist Account of Constitutive Relevance* 
 
Emily Prychitko** 
 
Abstract    An epistemic account of constitutive relevance lists the criteria 
by which scientists can identify the components of mechanisms in empirical 
practice. Three prominent claims from Craver (2007) form a promising 
basis for an account. First, constitutive relevance is established by means of 
interlevel experiments. Second, interlevel experiments are executions of 
interventions. Third, there is no interlevel causation between a mechanism 
and its components. Currently, no account on offer respects all three claims. 
I offer my causal situationist account of constitutive relevance that respects 
the claims. By situating a part of a mechanism on the causal chain between 
the mechanism’s input and output, components can be identified with 
interventions, without the interventions suggesting interlevel causation. The 
causal situationist account is the only account on offer so far that clearly fits 
within Craver’s (2007) framework.  
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Through a series of experiments, scientists have discovered that the middle temporal visual 
area (MT) is a component of the mechanism for motion perception. MT cells are active 
when motion is being perceived (Britten et al. 1992), inhibition of MT cells impairs one’s 
ability to perceive motion (Newsome and Paré 1988), and direct stimulation of MT cells 
makes one perceive a particular direction of motion (Salzman et al. 1990). Because MT 
cells are a physical part of the neural mechanism for motion perception and their activity 
is relevant to the perceiving of motion, any account of constitutive relevance should yield 
that MT cells are a component of the mechanism for motion perception. 
  An epistemic account of constitutive relevance lists the criteria by which scientists can 
determine, in empirical practice, whether something is a component of a mechanism. Such 
an account is essential for distinguishing the components of the mechanism from mere parts 
or causes of the mechanism’s behavior.  
 There are three claims that provide a promising basis for an account of constitutive 
relevance, as originally put forth by Craver (2007). First, in practice, constitutive relevance 
between a mechanism and its components is discovered by way of interlevel experiments 
(Craver 2007; Craver and Bechtel 2007; Kaplan 2012). Second, like experiments that 
establish causal relevance, interlevel experiments involve Woodwardian interventions 
(Craver 2007; Craver and Bechtel 2007; Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015; Krickel 2018). 
Third, constitutive relevance is, nevertheless, distinct from, rather than a type of, causal 
relevance (Craver 2007; Romero 2015; Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015; Krickel 2018).  
 Though there are several accounts of constitutive relevance on offer, none of them 
respect all three claims. Some authors even suggest that it is impossible for any account to 
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respect all three (Baumgartner and Casini 2017). I will propose my ‘causal situationist’ 
account of constitutive relevance which satisfies the three claims straightforwardly. 
 
 
2 Constraints for an Account of Constitutive Relevance  
 
The mechanism for a phenomenon consists in the entities and activities that instantiate the 
phenomenon when they are causally and spatiotemporally organized in the right way1 
(Craver 2007; see Glennan 2002 and Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005 for other definitions). 
Where S is the mechanism and y-ing is its behavior of interest, S’s y-ing is the occurrence 
of the phenomenon. S’s y-ing is constituted by the organized activities of S’s components, 
Xs’ F-ings. The relationship between the mechanism and its components is both 
spatiotemporal and active. That is, physical parts of S are components only if their 
behaviors are constitutively relevant to the y-ing of S.  
 We can think of S’s y-ing as consisting in the causal chain between S’s input or startup 
conditions (SIN) and S’s output or termination conditions (SOUT). SIN is that which causes S 
to y, that is, causes the Xs to F. This then causes an output to appear. The basic structure 
of S’s y-ing is captured in Fig. 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Presenting a subject with a moving stimulus (SIN), for instance, causes her to perceive 
motion. The perceiving of motion (S’s y-ing) consists in the movement of light through the 
eyeball, the transduction of energy through the retina, the traveling of information through 
the optic nerve and thalamus, the building of representations in the visual areas (Xs’ F-
ings); these active entities are causally related to each other. Once the subject has perceived 
motion, this causes her to, for instance, say she saw something move (SOUT).  
 This is, of course, a simplistic characterization of mechanisms. Any mechanism will 
likely have numerous inputs and outputs and different particular manners of y-ing. The 
spatiotemporal boundaries of the mechanism may not be clear. Some components may 
stand in causal loops. A set of known and perhaps unknown background conditions, 
                                                        
1 Assuming the relevant background conditions are present. One’s heart must be beating, for 
example, for one’s mechanism for motion perception to operate at all.  
Fig. 1 A mechanism. S’s y-ing is the explanandum phenomenon, and consists in Xs’ F-ings.  
Xs’ F-ings constitute a causal chain from SIN to SOUT. Adapted from Craver (2007, p. 7).   
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unrepresented in the diagram, are required for the mechanism to work in the first place. 
Whether something counts as a background condition or as an input to the mechanism 
may be somewhat arbitrary. Nevertheless, the simplistic characterization will do for our 
purposes, since it highlights the core of many mechanisms (Craver 2007).2 
 The goal of an epistemic account of constitutive relevance is to tell us how to identify 
the components of a mechanism in practice. It lists the criteria by which one can show, 
empirically, that something is a component of a mechanism. Multiple accounts may 
provide sufficient conditions for the empirical establishment of constitutive relevance. Even 
if there is one correct set of necessary and sufficient conditions for whether something is, in 
fact, a component of a mechanism, there may be several actual or merely possible practices 
that scientists can use to discover that something is a component. I will offer one epistemic 
account, but recognize that other accounts may highlight different empirical practices that 
are capable of identifying components just as well.  
 For the purposes of this paper, however, I will focus on three claims prominent in 
Craver (2007) and treat them as constraints on an account of constitutive relevance, with 
the hope of finding an account that meets them. There are four reasons for this project. 
First, as I will argue, the constraints form at least one promising basis for an account. 
Second, as I will show, there is currently no account that meets the constraints. Third, it is 
worth determining if it is even possible for a good account to respect the constraints; if not, 
that may point to a problem with Craver’s framework. Fourth, proponents of Craver’s work 
may have an interest in discovering an account of constitutive relevance that fits in his 
framework.  
 The first claim from Craver is that scientists discover the components of mechanisms 
by executing multiple interlevel experiments (Craver 2007; Craver and Bechtel 2007; 
Kaplan 2012). Craver (2007) spells out the experiments in detail. In top-down experiments, 
scientists manipulate the mechanism as a whole to see if this thereby creates a change in 
the putative component, which must be a physical part of the mechanism. For example, 
Britten et al. (1992) showed monkeys an array of dots, where a proportion of the dots moved 
in the same direction while the rest moved in random directions. Meanwhile, the activity 
of the monkeys’ MT cells was recorded with an electrode. After being shown the array, the 
monkeys had to indicate in which direction the dots had moved by looking towards the 
direction of motion. Britten et al. found that the firing rate of the monkeys’ MT cells 
accounted for the accuracy of the monkeys’ judgments. The higher the firing rate, the more 
accurate the monkeys’ judgments tended to be.  
 In bottom-up experiments, scientists manipulate the putative component to see if this 
creates a change in the mechanism as a whole. For example, Nichols and Newsome (2002) 
did an experiment with a similar design as Britten et al., but on some trials they stimulated 
the MT cells while the array was being viewed by the monkeys. They found that stimulation 
of the MT cells significantly influenced the monkeys’ judgments of the direction in which 
the dots had moved. Another type of bottom-up experiment involves inhibiting, rather than 
activating, the putative component. Newsome and Paré (1988) also ran a similar 
experiment, but they lesioned the monkeys’ MT cells unilaterally. They found that this 
increased the monkeys’ threshold for motion perception in the lesioned hemifield. A greater 
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comprise a single causal chain, but are nevertheless components (Wimsatt 2007, pp. 281-287).  
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proportion of the dots had to be moving in the same direction than before the lesions for 
the monkeys to judge the direction of motion accurately.  
 Interlevel experiments gauge the relationship between a mechanism and some of its 
parts. They screen out the parts that are related to the mechanism merely spatiotemporally. 
Melanin in the iris, for example, is a mere part of the mechanism for motion perception. 
Top-down and bottom-up experiments in which the behavior of the putative component 
accompanies the behavior of the mechanism suffice jointly for constitutive relevance.  
 Top-down experiments alone are not sufficient. Suppose a top-down experiment shows 
that the ventral striatum is active when an array of moving dots is presented to a subject. It 
might be that the ventral striatum is active only because the subject expects to get rewarded 
for judging the direction of motion accurately. Were that the case, the ventral striatum 
might be a component of the mechanism for reward learning, but not for motion 
perception per se.  
 Bottom-up experiments alone are also not sufficient. Lesioning the motor cortex of a 
subject might decrease the accuracy of his judgments in a motion perception task. That 
may simply be because the activity of the motor cortex is necessary for the subject to 
perform his response, instead of for him to perceive motion. Top-down and bottom-up 
experiments together ensure that the same part is behaving in a constitutively relevant way 
to the mechanism whenever the part changes or the mechanism as a whole changes.  
 The structure of interlevel experiments is similar to experiments that establish causal 
relevance (Craver 2007; Craver and Bechtel 2007). Both involve manipulations of some 
variable with respect to another in order to determine whether an explanatory relationship 
exists between the variables. Because of this similarity, it is promising to build an account 
of constitutive relevance from an account of causal relevance.  
 Woodward’s popular (2003) interventionist account of causation, for example, enables 
us to spell out causal experiments in terms of ‘ideal interventions’. Some variable, I, counts 
as an intervening variable for a variable, A, with respect to another variable, B, if and only 
if 
 
(I1) I is a cause of A. 
(I2) I acts as a switch for all other causes of A. 
(I3) Any causally directed path from I to B goes through A. 
(I4) I is statistically independent of any variable, C, that 
causes B and that is on a directed path which does not 
go through A (adapted from Woodward 2003, p. 98).  
 
I’s taking on a particular value is an ideal intervention on A with respect to B, then, if and 
only if I’s taking on that value causes A to take on a certain value, and I counts as an 
intervening variable for A with respect to B (ibid.). For Woodward, an ideal intervention 
on A with respect to B, where all variables outside of this causal path are held constant, is 
necessary and sufficient for A to be a direct cause of B (for more detail, see Woodward 
2003, p. 59).   
 Because we are interested in discovering constitutive relevance in practice, we will say 
that if scientists closely approximate an ideal intervention on A with respect to B, they can 
conclude that A is causally relevant to B. This is because they will have shown that the 
change in A, rather than changes in confounding variables, is likely what produced the 
change they later observed in B.  
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 The manipulations in successful interlevel experiments can be formulated as executions 
of (or at least close approximations of) ideal interventions. Craver (2007) originally 
conceived of successful top-down experiments as executions of ideal interventions on S’s y-
ing with respect to X’s F-ing, and successful bottom-up experiments as ideal interventions 
on X’s F-ing with respect to S’s y-ing. The idea was that these ideal interventions require 
scientists to hold potential confounding variables constant, so as to observe the relationship 
solely between S’s y-ing and putative components.  
 Since Craver, other formulations of interlevel experiments in interventionist terms have 
come about. Some of these spell out ideal interventions as taking place between variables 
other than S’s y-ing and X’s F-ing. Some draw on Woodward’s (2015) extended version 
of interventionism, which posits what I will call ‘ideal* interventions’. Ideal* interventions 
are the same as ideal interventions, except that instead of the intervening variable having 
to meet (I3) and (I4), in addition to (I1) and (I2), it must meet  
 
(I3*) Any causally directed path from I to B goes through A, 
or through some variable that is related to A by 
supervenience.  
(I4*) I is statistically independent of any variable, C, that 
causes B, that is on a directed path which does not go 
through A, and that is not related by supervenience to 
A (adapted from Woodward 2015, p. 333).  
 
Ideal* interventions suffice for causal relevance. Unlike ideal interventions, they do not 
require scientists to hold variables that stand in supervenience relations to A constant. 
Because of the looser constraints, there can be more ideal* than ideal interventions, so the 
extended version of interventionism admits more causal relations than the original version. 
As we will see, some authors appeal to ideal* interventions in their accounts of constitutive 
relevance.  
 The second claim is, then, that interlevel experiments are executions of interventions 
(on variables that must be specified). The interventions may or may not be ideal/ideal*, 
depending on how successful the experiments are. Any construal of interlevel experiments 
in terms of interventions is prima facie attractive, since it accounts for the similarity between 
the empirical discovery of constitutive and causal relevance. An account of constitutive 
relevance that interprets interlevel experiments in non-interventionist terms would need to 
explain away the apparent similarity of the manipulations that scientists execute in causal 
and interlevel experiments, and argue that the empirical practices themselves are 
significantly different. An account that requires ideal/ideal* interventions also 
automatically demands the rigor of holding potential confounding variables constant. 
Without holding potential confounds constant, the interventions would not count as 
ideal/ideal*, so the account would not be satisfied. This is an easy way for an account to 
prevent certain non-components from counting mistakenly as constitutively relevant to a 
mechanism.  
 The third claim is that even though constitutive and causal relevance are both 
discovered by means of ideal/ideal* interventions, constitutive relevance is not causal. 
There is no interlevel causation between a mechanism and its components (Craver and 
Bechtel 2007; Romero 2015; Craver 2007; Baumgartner and Gebharter 2015). Causes are 
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typically seen as distinct spatiotemporal events from their effects. But the changes in a 
mechanism and its components overlap both spatially and temporally, given that the 
mechanism consists in the components. The perceiving of motion and the activity of MT 
cells are not causally related, since the perceiving of motion partially consists, 
spatiotemporally and actively, in the activity of MT cells. Neither event is independent from 
the other in the way that is required for events to be causally related.  
 These, then, are the three claims from Craver (2007) that I will treat as constraints on 
an account of constitutive relevance: 
 
(1) Components are identified by means of interlevel 
experiments.  
(2) Interlevel experiments are executions of interventions.  
(3) There is no interlevel causation.  
 
To fully establish the truth of these claims, each would need more support. While I believe 
there is a strong case to be made in favor of each claim (see, e.g., Craver 2007; Craver and 
Bechtel 2007), my present concern is to find an account of constitutive relevance that 
respects all three. As such, I will treat the claims as given. 
 In addition to each claim having independent motivation, using this set of claims as 
constraints on an account of constitutive relevance is promising. An account that respects 
the three constraints can potentially recognize and make sense of existing empirical 
practices that actually establish constitutive relevance, as well as provide guidance about 
how one could identify components. While there may be innumerable practices that could 
establish constitutive relevance, formulating an account on, in part, actual empirical 
practice makes it more likely that the account will be both feasible and fruitful empirically. 
Explaining how the interventions executed in interlevel experiments serve to identify 
components, while maintaining that the interventions do not show interlevel causation, can 
yield an account with some degree of both descriptive and theoretical adequacy.  
 
 
3 Accounts of Constitutive Relevance 
 
I will argue that none of the epistemic accounts of constitutive relevance that are currently 
on offer satisfy all three constraints, even though some are presented as doing so.  
 Craver’s (2007) mutual manipulability account of constitutive relevance requires an 
ideal intervention on S’s y-ing with respect to X’s F-ing (in top-down experiments) and on 
X’s F-ing with respect to S’s y-ing (in bottom-up experiments), where X is a spatiotemporal 
part of S, for X’s F-ing to count as a component of S’s y-ing. As many have argued, any 
intervention on S’s y-ing with respect to X’s F-ing cannot be ideal (Baumgartner and 
Gebharter 2015; Romero 2015; Harinen 2018; Krickel 2018). Ideal interventions require, 
per criterion (I3), that scientists alter the second variable of interest only through initially 
intervening on the first variable of interest. An intervention on both X’s F-ing and S’s y-
ing at the same time is not ideal, since the change to X’s F-ing would not have been caused 
by the change in S’s y-ing. Because X’s F-ing is constitutively relevant to S’s y-ing, any 
intervention on S’s y-ing, when X’s F-ing changes, is also a direct, simultaneous 
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intervention on X’s F-ing. Since this intervention cannot be ideal, the criteria of Craver’s 
account can never be met by the components of mechanisms.3  
 While Craver’s account was put forth as an account that respects all three constraints, 
it in fact forces us to reject at least one. We must deny that the criteria of his account are 
met in practice. We might then reject (1), holding that interlevel experiments actually do 
not enable scientists to discover components. Alternatively, we might deny (2) and maintain 
that while interlevel experiments do allow for the identification of components, they do not 
do so by means of interventions. We would have to explicate interlevel experiments in other 
terms.  
 Baumgartner and Gebharter (2015) require an ideal* intervention on S’s y-ing with 
respect to X’s F-ing (in top-down experiments) and on X’s F-ing with respect to S’s y-ing 
(in bottom-up experiments), where X is a spatiotemporal part of S, in addition to evidence 
that every variable that causes a change in S’s y-ing simultaneously causes a change in at 
least one X’s F-ing in a set of putative components. Notice that ideal* interventions 
between S’s y-ing and X’s F-ing are indeed possible, since criteria (I3*) and (I4*) allow the 
intervening variable to change both variables directly. However, these ideal* interventions 
would suggest that S’s y-ing and X’s F-ing are causally related, since ideal/ideal* 
interventions suffice for causal relevance (Woodward 2003; Baumgartner and Gebharter 
2015; Harinen 2018). Baumgartner and Gebharter, to keep from accepting interlevel 
causation, introduce a principle of causation that says that for two variables to be causally 
related, it must be possible to induce a change in the first before this thereby creates a 
change in the second. This is not possible for S’s y-ing and X’s F-ing, so interlevel 
causation is blocked. Baumgartner and Gebharter, therefore, respect (3).  
 They fail to fulfill (1), however, since they maintain that interlevel experiments are not 
sufficient for establishing constitutive relevance. Interlevel experiments do not establish that 
every cause of S’s y-ing is also a cause of some X’s F-ing. Scientists, as a matter of fact, have 
rarely if ever found all of the causes of any S’s y-ing, but they have nevertheless identified 
components of mechanisms. They have done so by executing interlevel experiments. 
Exactly how many interlevel experiments must be performed and how many different 
inputs to S’s y-ing they must make use of in order to identify components are worthwhile 
questions. But if we want to maintain that scientists have in fact identified components, we 
cannot hold that establishing constitutive relevance requires showing that every cause of S’s 
y-ing simultaneously changes some X’s F-ing.  
 Krickel (2018) requires an ideal or ideal* intervention on a temporal part of S’s y-ing 
with respect to X’s F-ing (in top-down experiments) and on X’s F-ing with respect to a 
temporal part of S’s y-ing (in bottom-up experiments), where X is a spatiotemporal part of 
S. Though Krickel presents the account as maintaining (3), it actually does not. The 
ideal/ideal* interventions are performed on the same physical entity, just at different times; 
they are on the whole (at a time) with respect to the part, and on the part with respect to 
the whole (at a time). But the part is part of the whole at all times. Granting causal relations 
between the whole (at any time) and the part is, then, granting interlevel causation. It is 
granting that the whole and its parts causally interact. What this series of ideal/ideal* 
                                                        
3 For in-depth explanations of why interventions on S’s y-ing with respect to X’s F-ing cannot be 
ideal, see Romero (2015) and Baumgartner and Gebharter (2015, pp. 737-745).  
 
8 
interventions gives us is a web of interlevel causal relations between S’s y-ing and Xs’ F-
ings. But we do not want to admit any causal relations between them. The whole set of Xs’ 
F-ings is (at least token) identical to S’s y-ing, rather than causally related to S’s y-ing at 
all.  
 Harinen (2018) demands an ideal* intervention on SIN with respect to X’s F-ing (in 
top-down experiments) and on X’s F-ing with respect to SOUT (in bottom-up experiments), 
where X is a part of S. He concludes that there is interlevel causation, rejecting (3), since 
he thinks of SIN and SOUT as supervening over entities and activities that lie on the same 
mechanistic level as Xs’ F-ings.  
 Harbecke (2015), Gebharter (2016), and Baumgartner and Casini (2017) give accounts 
that do not appeal to ideal/ideal* interventions at all, so they effectively deny (2). They also 
require methods other than interlevel experiments for establishing constitutive relevance, 
so they might deny (1) as well.  
 The current accounts of constitutive relevance, then, fail to fulfill the three constraints. 
In fact, the difficulty of creating a satisfying account that fits within Craver’s framework has 
led Baumgartner and Casini (2017) to say the following.  
 
Since constitution is a noncausal form of dependence – as commonly 
assumed in mechanistic theorizing – one cannot simply tweak a successful 
account of causation to obtain a successful account of constitution. Rather, 
constitution must be defined within a theoretical framework that reflects its 
distinctly noncausal nature. Furthermore, the inference to constitution can 
neither in theory nor in practice proceed along the lines of the inference to 
causation. The main reason is that, while there exist ideal experimental 
designs allowing for the generation of unconfounded data that conclusively 
establish the existence of causal relations, no such experimental designs exist 
for the inference to constitution . . . Hence, the inference to constitution is 
inherently underdetermined by experimental evidence. (pp. 215-216) 
 
The whole endeavor, according to this view, of trying to create an account of constitutive 
relevance that respects the three constraints is futile. Constitutive relevance simply cannot 
be established by interventions executed in interlevel experiments, given that it is not a 
causal relationship.  
 Contra Baumgartner and Casini, I will now offer my causal situationist account of 
constitutive relevance, which respects the three constraints straightforwardly. It allows for 
the empirical identification of components by way of ideal/ideal* interventions, without 
entailing interlevel causation.  
 
 
4 The Causal Situationist Account 
 
If X’s F-ing is an actual component of S’s y-ing, interlevel experiments involve changes to 
at least four variables overall. In top-down experiments, scientists make S y by changing 
SIN, creating differences in X’s F-ing and SOUT. In bottom-up experiments, scientists might 
make X F, creating differences in S’s y-ing and SOUT.  
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 Imagine a top-down experiment as involving an intervention on SIN with respect to X’s 
F-ing (where X is a part of S), instead of, say, an intervention on S’s y-ing with respect to 
X’s F-ing. SIN and X’s F-ing are merely causally related, since the presence of SIN triggers 
the causal procession of the components’ activities, one of which is this X’s F-ing. SIN and 
X’s F-ing are not constitutively related, since X’s F-ing is a component of S’s y-ing, not 
SIN. SIN is not a part of S’s y-ing, because SIN is that which causes S to y. The relationship 
between SIN and X’s F-ing is a perfectly normal causal relationship. This intervention, 
then, can be ideal. 
 The difference between conceiving of a top-down experiment as involving an 
intervention on S’s y-ing with respect to X’s F-ing (a la Craver 2007 and Baumgartner 
and Gebharter 2015), and an intervention on SIN with respect to X’s F-ing (a la Harinen 
2018 and myself) is captured in Fig. 2.  
 
 
 
Here, the arrow points to where the intervening variable (I) acts causally, and the shaded 
areas represent the two variables between which the intervention is said to occur. In Fig. 
2a, the intervening variable acts on both S’s y-ing and X3’s F3-ing directly, so the 
intervention cannot be ideal. In Fig. 2b, the intervening variable acts only on SIN directly, 
and the change in SIN then causes a change in X3’s F3-ing, so the intervention can be ideal.4 
 Imagine, as well, a bottom-up experiment as involving an intervention on X’s F-ing 
with respect to SOUT, rather than on X’s F-ing with respect to S’s y-ing. Because SOUT lies 
outside of the boundaries of S’s y-ing, X’s F-ing and SOUT are solely causally related. 
However, in this case, it is not clear that the intervention can be ideal. For the intervention 
on X’s F-ing with respect to SOUT to be ideal, any causal path from the intervening variable 
to SOUT must go through X’s F-ing causally, given criterion (I3). The intervening variable 
causes a change in both S’s y-ing and X’s F-ing, given their constitutive relationship. But 
the causal path from S’s y-ing to SOUT does not include X’s F-ing. That is, it is not the case 
that the intervening variable causes a change in S’s y-ing, which then causes a change in 
X’s F-ing, which then causes a change in SOUT. Therefore, the intervention on X’s F-ing 
                                                        
4 Diagrams of the interventions performed in interlevel experiments that are similar to Fig. 2b can 
be found in Bechtel (in press). 
Fig. 2 In (a), an intervention on S’s y-ing with respect to X’s F-ing, the intervening variable, 
I, causes a change in both S’s y-ing and X3’s F3-ing directly. In (b), an intervention on SIN with 
respect to X’s F-ing, I causes a change in only SIN directly, which then causes a change in X3’s 
F3-ing. 
X2 F2-ing 
X1 F1-ing X4 F4-ing SOUT SIN 
X3 F3-ing 
S y-ing 
I 
X2 F2-ing 
X1 F1-ing X4 F4-ing SOUT SIN 
X3 F3-ing 
S y-ing 
I 
(a) (b) 
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with respect to SOUT cannot be ideal. The constitutive relationship between S’s y-ing and 
X’s F-ing violates (I3) in interventions on X’s F-ing with respect to SOUT.  
 For this reason, we must instead require an ideal* intervention on X’s F-ing with 
respect to SOUT. This intervention is possible, since (I3*) allows the intervening variable to 
cause S’s y-ing, which is related to X’s F-ing by supervenience, which then causes SOUT. 
(I3*) doesn’t require X’s F-ing to be another joint on the causal path from the intervening 
variable, to S’s y-ing, to SOUT.  
 Conceiving of the interventions executed in interlevel experiments as occurring on SIN 
with respect to X’s F-ing and on X’s F-ing with respect to SOUT makes sense of constitutive 
relevance. Demonstrating that a part of S is caused by SIN and causes SOUT establishes that 
it is a component of S’s y-ing. S’s y-ing consists in the entities and activities on the causal 
chain between SIN and SOUT. Showing that something lies on this causal chain would 
establish that the part is constitutively relevant to S’s y-ing.  
 Furthermore, this conception of the interventions does not entail interlevel causation. 
It would only entail that SIN is causally relevant to X’s F-ing and that X’s F-ing is causally 
relevant to SOUT. Any component of S’s y-ing stands in these causal relationships with SIN 
and SOUT. Neither ideal/ideal* intervention would establish that X’s F-ing is causally 
relevant to S’s y-ing.  
 Here, then, are the criteria of my causal situationist account. X’s F-ing is a component 
of S’s y-ing if 
 
(CS1) X is a part of S.  
(CS2) An ideal intervention on SIN changes X’s F-ing.  
(CS3) An ideal* intervention on X’s F-ing changes SOUT. 
 
The idea is that to show that X’s F-ing is a component of S’s y-ing, one must situate X’s 
F-ing on the causal chain between SIN and SOUT. That is what the interventions are for.  
 These criteria are very similar to those of Harinen’s (2018) account, but our accounts 
differ in important ways. Harinen appeals to ideal* rather than ideal interventions for the 
same reasons that he accepts interlevel causation. Namely, he takes SIN and SOUT to 
supervene on entities and activities that are on the same mechanistic level as Xs’ F-ings. 
Whether SIN and SOUT supervene over entities and activities other than Xs’ F-ings is not 
made clear on his account, but either way, this position is problematic.   
 First, it is problematic to think of SIN and SOUT as supervening over any of Xs’ F-ing, 
for they do not. They are not parts of S’s y-ing. Instead, they are defined by their causal 
relations to S’s y-ing: SIN is that which causes S to y, and SOUT is the causal effect of S’s y-
ing. It seems generally to be the case that an input to and output from a system are not 
constitutive of the system, but are causes and effects of the system’s behavior. This being 
so, considering them parts of the system would itself entail part-whole causation, which we 
are trying to avoid. Keeping SIN and SOUT outside of the boundaries of S’s y-ings allows us 
to say that the ideal/ideal* interventions of the causal situationist account do not suggest 
interlevel causation.   
 If, instead, Harinen takes SIN and SOUT to supervene on only non-components of S’s y-
ing, that problem can be avoided. But it would still be incorrect to infer interlevel causation. 
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One thing lies on a higher mechanistic level than another thing if and only if the latter is a 
component of the former (Povich and Craver 2017). Even if SIN and SOUT supervene on 
non-components, any X’s F-ing is not a component of SIN nor SOUT. So, SIN and SOUT do 
not lie on a higher mechanistic level than any X’s F-ing. Furthermore, two things are on 
the same mechanistic level only if they are components of the same mechanism (ibid.). The 
components and non-components of S’s y-ing thus do not lie on the same mechanistic 
level. Even if SIN and SOUT were on a higher mechanistic level than non-components of S’s 
y-ing, given that the non-components and components of S’s y-ing are not on the same 
mechanistic level, SIN and SOUT still would not lie on a higher level than any X’s F-ing. For 
these reasons, there is no interlevel relationship between any X’s F-ing and SIN or SOUT. 
Ideal/ideal* interventions on these variables, then, do not establish interlevel causation.  
 The causal situationist account, unlike Harinen’s account, respects the three 
constraints. First, it maintains that components are identified through interlevel 
experiments. We have not changed our conception of how the interlevel experiments 
themselves are conducted empirically. Second, it maintains that interlevel experiments are 
executions of interventions. Third, it can maintain that there is no interlevel causation, 
since the ideal/ideal* interventions on SIN with respect to X’s F-ing and on X’s F-ing with 
respect to SOUT do not indicate that there is interlevel causation.  
 Consider again the perceiving of motion, S’s y-ing, and the activity of MT cells, X’s F-
ing. What counts as SIN and SOUT, and the spatiotemporal boundaries of S’s y-ing, is 
somewhat a matter of choice. Intuitively, though, we might think of S’s y-ing as including 
the head spatiotemporally, SIN as including the presentation of a moving stimulus, and 
SOUT as including a behavioral response that a subject has perceived motion.   
 By the causal situationist account, then, we would say that top-down experiments are 
interventions on the subject’s being shown a moving stimulus with respect to the activity of 
the subject’s MT cells. In the Britten et al. (1992) study in which monkeys’ MT cell activity 
was recorded while each monkey viewed arrays of moving dots, we would say the scientists 
intervened on the presentation of the array by beginning the computer program that the 
monkey watched. The array’s appearing then caused activity in the monkey’s eyeballs, 
which later caused activity in the MT cells. If the array had not appeared, other things 
constant, the monkey’s MT cells would not have been active.   
 Bottom-up experiments are interventions on the subject’s MT cells with respect to the 
subject’s response of having perceived motion. In the Nichols and Newsome (2002) study, 
we can say the scientists intervened on the activity of the monkey’s MT cells by stimulating 
them with an electrode while the monkey viewed the array, which later caused the monkey 
to mark its response by looking in a particular direction – namely, closer to the direction 
which the stimulated MT cells selectively respond to. In the Newsome and Paré (1988) 
study, we can say the scientists intervened on the MT cells by lesioning them, which then 
caused the monkey to give fewer correct answers about the direction of motion than before 
the lesions.  
 For any phenomenon, before executing the interventions, scientists likely will not know 
what lies on the causal chain between SIN and SOUT. The purpose of the interventions is to 
discover the components of S’s y-ing. Scientists could begin with a vague functional and 
spatiotemporal characterization of the phenomenon. That is, they would need a sense of 
the spatiotemporal extension of S’s y-ing, and of a few of its inputs and outputs. They 
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would then execute the interventions to determine which parts’ activities are on the causal 
chain that constitutes S’s y-ing. 
 Alternatively, scientists might begin by discovering a collection of entities that causally 
interact, then identify a portion of the collection as a mechanism for some phenomenon. 
Which entities and activities count as components, instead of inputs or outputs, will depend 
on where they stipulate the spatiotemporal and functional boundaries of the mechanism to 
be. Their labelling some of the entities and activities components requires that they have 
an idea of the boundaries of the mechanism.   
 While this may sound like a problem for the causal situationist account, all accounts of 
constitutive relevance discussed here also demand that scientists know, more or less, the 
spatiotemporal boundaries of S’s y-ing. Otherwise, they could not tell if they have caused 
changes in S’s y-ing through interventions, nor if X is a physical part of S. Any account of 
constitutive relevance is likely to demand this, given what it is for something to be a 
component of a mechanism. The goal is to break an existing phenomenon down to its 
physical and active parts. Some knowledge of the existing phenomenon is necessary to 
proceed with this goal.  
 Unlike Baumgartner and Gebharter’s (2015) account, which requires establishing that 
every cause of S’s y-ing is also a cause of some X’s F-ing, the causal situationist account 
does not demand empirical practices that are nearly impossible to achieve. In fact, the 
account is hardly more demanding than practices that establish causal relevance. 
Furthermore, we might say the causal situationist account is fulfilled whenever interlevel 
experiments successfully change both S’s y-ing and X’s F-ing with suitable control of 
confounding variables. These experiments are executions of ideal/ideal* interventions on 
SIN with respect to X’s F-ing and on X’s F-ing with respect to SOUT. The causal situationist 
account is fruitful empirically.  
 One might worry that satisfying the causal situationist account merely reveals a causal 
chain, rather than a mechanism. Weinberger (2017), for instance, argues that accounts of 
constitutive relevance that construe components as standing in causal relationships with SIN 
and SOUT, as the causal situationist account does, inadvertently reduce constitutive 
relevance to causal relevance. To secure constitutive relevance, which is an interlevel 
relationship, Weinberger says we would need a principled means of showing that SIN and 
SOUT lie on a different mechanistic level from Xs’ F-ings. Otherwise, the ideal/ideal* 
interventions would establish mere intralevel causal relationships. This is problematic, he 
thinks, because these accounts say that the causal relationships between SIN, X’s F-ing, and 
SOUT are the ones that make for the interlevel constitutive relationship between X’s F-ing 
and S’s y-ing. But if all we have shown are intralevel causal relationships, we do not get 
the interlevel constitutive relationship for free. Mechanistic explanations would, then, 
reduce to mere causal explanations.  
 The causal situationist account, first, does not reduce the constitutive relationship 
between some X’s F-ing and S’s y-ing to the causal relationships between SIN, X’s F-ing, 
and SOUT. This is simply because it is not an account of what it is for something to be a 
component of a mechanism, metaphysically. Rather, it is an account of how to go about 
identifying components in practice. What it reduces is the empirical establishment of the 
constitutive relationship to the empirical establishment of certain causal and spatiotemporal 
relationships.  
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 Second, the account has requirements that cannot be met by variables that are merely 
causally related. Suppose we wanted to show, by reductio, that A can count as a component 
of B by the causal situationist account, even though A is causally relevant to B. This is 
impossible. Given that A is causally relevant to B, it must not be the case that A is a physical 
part of B, since parts and wholes cannot causally interact. Therefore, A cannot count as a 
component of B by the causal situationist account, since it fails to fulfill criterion (CS1). 
 Suppose instead we wanted to show, by reductio, that, where A is causally relevant to 
B, B is causally relevant to C, and C is causally relevant to D, the causal situationist account 
can mistakenly treat this causal chain as a mechanism and identify one of the variables as 
a component. This too is impossible. Criteria (CS2) and (CS3) could be met; an ideal 
intervention on A can change B, and an ideal* intervention on B can change C. But B still 
cannot count as a component of D by the causal situationist account. Given that B and D 
are causally related, B must not be a physical part of D, violating (CS1). Or, D does not 
cause C, whereas in an actual mechanism, S’s y-ing causes SOUT, by definition, so applying 
the causal situationist account is inappropriate to begin with. In either case, variables that 
stand in mere causal relationships cannot fulfill the causal situationist account. Variables 
that stand in constitutive relationships can fulfill the account. This suggests that the causal 
situationist account does not, and cannot, establish mere causal relationships.   
 Third, we can maintain that every X’s F-ing is on a different level from S’s y-ing. All 
it is for some variable, A, to be on a lower mechanistic level than some variable, B, is for A 
to be a component of B (Povich and Craver 2017; Craver and Bechtel 2007). Because the 
causal situationist account allows for the identification of components, it thereby enables us 
to say that some things are on lower or higher mechanistic levels than other things. X’s F-
ing being on a lower level than S’s y-ing does not require that it is also on a lower level 
from SIN and SOUT. X’s F-ing is not the kind of thing that could be on a lower (nor higher) 
level than SIN and SOUT, since it is not related to them constitutively (see, e.g., Povich and 
Craver 2017). There is no question, then, of an interlevel relationship between X’s F-ing 
and SIN and SOUT.  
 Even if it is the case, as I have granted, that SIN and SOUT are defined by their causal 
relationships to S’s y-ing, and at least some inputs and outputs must be identified before 
any components of S’s y-ing can be identified, this does not mean that SIN and SOUT indeed 
lie on the same mechanistic level as S’s y-ing. Any X’s F-ing is on a lower level than S’s y-
ing, and the causal situationist account establishes causal relationships between SIN, X’s F-
ing, and SOUT. To refrain from admitting interlevel causation, then, we cannot say that SIN 
and SOUT are on the same level as S’s y-ing. We can maintain, nevertheless, that Xs’ F-
ings are on a lower level than S’s y-ing just because they constitute S’s y-ing.  
 On the causal situationist account, then, the general term ‘interlevel experiment’ and 
the specific terms ‘top-down experiment’ and ‘bottom-up experiment’ are not quite 
appropriate. The relevant interventions do not involve variables that stand on different 
mechanistic levels.  
 Even though satisfaction of the causal situationist account does demonstrate causal 
relationships between SIN, X’s F-ing, and SOUT, these are not the only relationships the 
account demands. It also requires a spatiotemporal relationship between X and S, and 
causal relationships between SIN, S’s y-ing, and SOUT. This bundle of relationships, rather 
than just the causal relationships Weinberger discusses, is what makes for constitutive 
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relevance between X’s F-ing and S’s y-ing. X’s being a physical part of S, and being caused 
by and causing the same things as S’s y-ing, are what entail that X’s F-ing is a component 
of S’s y-ing.  
 It is also due to this bundle of relationships that scientists cannot lose sight of S’s y-ing 
when using the causal situationist account. It would not be possible, as long as the criteria 
are in fact being met, to accidentally highlight nothing but causal relationships. Nor, for 
that matter, to highlight relationships that are utterly irrelevant to S’s y-ing. Working with 
variables that scientists already know are causally and spatiotemporally related to S’s y-ing 
and doing the relevant interventions ensure that they are discovering the actual 
components of S’s y-ing.  
 To summarize the causal situationist account, it enables scientists to discover the 
components of a mechanism by situating components on the causal chain between SIN and 
SOUT. Because S’s y-ing is that which causally occurs between SIN and SOUT, demonstrating 
that X is a part of S and is causally related to SIN and SOUT shows that X’s F-ing helps 
constitute S’s y-ing. It does not indicate interlevel causation. It therefore satisfies the three 
constraints very simply; it requires little more than thinking about the interventions 
executed in interlevel experiments as occurring on SIN with respect to X’s F-ing and on 
X’s F-ing with respect to SOUT.  
 
 
5 Conclusion  
 
Contra Baumgartner and Casini (2017), it is possible, then, to create an account of 
constitutive relevance that respects the three constraints from Craver (2007). The problem, 
it seems, is not with trying to build an account that satisfies those three constraints, but with 
which variables we take the interventions executed in interlevel experiments to occur 
between. The causal situationist account straightforwardly fits into Craver’s framework. If 
indeed the three constraints are accurate, the causal situationist account enables us to make 
sense of how some of the empirical practices that scientists actually use establish constitutive 
relevance, without misconstruing the constitutive relationship as causal. It is thus fruitful 
empirically and attractive theoretically and descriptively.  
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